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Unruly Innovation: Distributed Ledgers, 
Blockchains and the Protection of 
Transactional Rents 
 
We present a new conceptual model of disruptive innovation and apply it to the emerging financial 
technology of distributed ledgers and smart contracts. Our analysis illustrates the new features of this 
technology and why there is an argument that, in several respects, the combination of distributed 
ledger technology and cryptographically enabled contracts changes the economic framework within 
which individuals, firms and policy makers reside. This foundational level of disruption appears to 
have several new features, more notably a fundamental change in the game played by economic actors: 
the ability to self-deregulate. The paper clarifies these complex interactions and illustrates the main 
points using a recent case study from the Distributed Autonomous Organizations of the Ethereum 
project as well from a mathematical standpoint. Automation and distribution with powerful computing 
languages boost the speed of seizing opportunities as well as of tripping into (in-eliminable) severe 
risks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Unruly. adjective. Disorderly and disruptive and not amenable to 
discipline or control.” Oxford English Dictionary, 2016 (Our emphasis). 
 
Distributed ledgers combined with cryptographically enabled programs to operate on 
such ledgers (smart contracts) permit the ad-hoc creation of virtual organizations that 
ascribe ownership rights on virtual assets with almost limitless flexibility. This ability to 
program organizations able to run on anonymous end points and open hardware without 
recourse to existing legal frameworks opens up a universe of innovation possibilities for 
Financial Technology (FinTech), with very low transactions costs and high levels of flexibility. 
One of the earliest financial application of distributed ledgers was just distributed payment 
systems such as Bitcoin (Nakamoto 2008). In time, more sophisticated technologies have 
emerged to capture key financial components such as Exchanges. For instance, Massacci et al. 
(2017a) illustrates a market structure with auctions, clearing, trading and settlement of 
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contingent claims: the ledger technology is mixed with many different types of cryptographic 
technologies that provide evidence of position for participants, whilst tracking the solvency of 
each individual and the market as a whole. This type of organizational construction has several 
hundreds of individual components. Typically, modular technologies of this type have enabled 
periods of sustained and innovative growth that often disrupts existing incumbents 
(disruptive innovation). Yet, we argue in this paper that this type innovation proffers both a 
fascinating example of how technology can facilitate innovation in FinTech but expose 
organizations to new risks not present in traditional markets. 
Whilst Massacci et al. (2017a) finely specified such FinTech constructions to prove the 
equivalence with a centralized Exchange platform, several other distributed platforms (e.g. 
Ethereum, Nexos, etc.) propose themselves as vehicles for arbitrary constructions by making 
full use of expressive programming languages (Turing-Complete) to encode smart contracts. 
This definitely allows for a great degree of flexibility. However, to be Turing complete the 
programming language used to implement the nexus of contracts enshrines a level of 
complexity such that in the worst case the only way to understand its outcomes is to execute 
the program itself. For sufficiently expressive programs, e.g. with dynamic generation and 
evaluation of fragments of the code, unintended states of nature may occur by mistake or 
mischief. From an ethical viewpoint1, those states may be demonstrably unfair. However, as 
pointed by Lessig (1999), in a distributed scenario there is no legal framework to resolve 
disputes surrounding the initial intentions at incorporation. The code itself determines the 
authentic interpretation of its alleged specifications by being jury, judge and executioner. We 
argue that there is a need to both disentangle and re-integrate these concepts to appropriately 
model the impacts of these new technologies for FinTech, given their role as both a ‘product’ 
and a ‘legal framework’ for the creation, management and destruction of quasi firm-like 
entities. 
The contribution of this paper is to introduce this new notion of unruly innovation and 
document the implications on FinTech technology both with a qualitative case study as well as 
with a mathematical interpretation. To our knowledge this is the first paper to synthesize these 
                                                             
1 Using the legal concept of the viewpoint of the ‘resonable-ness’ of an average person representing society. 
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areas. 
 
1.1. A Primer on the Underpinning Technologies 
 
The underpinning technologies that drive this new medium are distributed ledger technologies 
(DLTs for short), block-chains and cryptocurrencies. DLTs are databases that are distributed 
across a large number of computing nodes in some form of network. The interesting feature of 
a DLT is that no one component of the network controls the overall information on the DLT, 
but can
 
dynamically query it. This technology allows a ledger to be maintained that tracks 
transactions and attempts to ensure that no (small) group of individuals can subvert the 
ledgers’ integrity.  
The ledger can record almost any information, but the commonest example of a financial use 
is in maintaining a ‘block-chain’. This is a systematically updated record of transactions that 
allows the ledger to allocate debits and credits and to ensure that some desired properties are 
maintained (for instance no double spending and no improper routing of finances).  
The values recorded in the transactions can be provided by a central bank, as recently 
proposed by Danezis and Meiklejohn (2015), exchanged with commodities or other existing 
currencies (Ripple Labs 2015) or created by engaging in a specific action such as solving hard 
computational problems
 
such as proof of work (Nakamoto 2008). The key issue is that no 
single machine or individual entity controls the distributed ledger (so that potentially all 
entities have a copy of it and hence the term distributed) and all participating entities run 
protocols that guarantee the security, integrity and coherence of the distributed copies through 
“Byzantine Fault Tolerance”, (i.e. where a minority of actors can behave in arbitrary ways).  
Essentially, if a ledger obeys these mathematical principles it should be highly unlikely that an 
individual or group of individuals coordinating could corrupt the ledger for financial gain, or 
commit economic injury to the other members, (Ben-Or 1983, Lynch 1989, Castro and Liskov 
2002).  
In the first instance, this innovation aims to replace standard payment transaction networks, 
this includes cash, but more importantly real time gross settlement (RTGS) of centrally banked 
money. Whilst some limitations exist on transaction volumes, frameworks built around DLTs 
are generally simple to scale as individual participants can choose to migrate to a technology 
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if the marginal benefit exceeds marginal cost, with very low fixed costs. In this respect, block 
chains are not overly different from the disruptive technologies based around the development 
of the rigid disk drive discussed by Christensen (1993) or Christensen et al. (1998).  
However, our interest focuses on the next stage developments in the arena of DLTs and block 
chains, that of cryptographically enabled contracts, sometimes referred to as smart contracts 
that replicate normal contracts but correspond to i) executable pieces of code, ii) enforceable 
through a cryptographically enable ledger.  
In this instance, the financial value of the contract (either through some proof or work, or 
proof of initial capital exchange) is assigned as a property right subject to specific rules. 
Recombination of these contracts into a nexus can be used to form contractual entities that 
resemble firms and markets. We argue that this property provides a more fundamental form 
of disruptive innovation where incumbents are more than simply firms in a particular market, 
as it challenges the very notion of a firm as a legal entity and the legal medium that enables 
contract enforcement. 
 
1.2. The Underlying Unruliness of the Technology 
 
A foundational point in the disruption literature focuses on the notion of an innovation, be it a 
technology or some more abstract innovation concept, that comes to replace existing offerings 
or frameworks and requires incumbents to adapt/resist or be replaced by new entrants, see 
Markides (2006) for an introspection on the various modelling frameworks in this area, or 
Christensen (1993), Christensen et al. (1998) for a proposed simple typology (sustaining 
versus disruptive technologies). Whilst the ideas from Christensen (1993) have proven 
controversial and provoked considerable debate in the innovation literature, this debate has 
centered on the notion of a company as the innovation nexus. 
We argue that the types of new technologies discussed herein, re-center this argument and 
hence, the notion of disruption. The founding notion of a firm lies in the ability to make 
contracts, either implicitly (under the shadow of the future) or more usually explicitly as 
a series of enforceable
 
agreements backed by a legal process (often by a civil process that 
enacts torts or delicts, that
 
remediate breaches of the terms of reference). The state, as a 
notional actor, provides the legal medium  that  guarantees  the  appropriate  redistribution  of  
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value   and  rights  to  the  appropriate individuals. 
The notion of firms as legal entities formed by a nexus of contracts underpins the concept of 
a commercial organization in respect to the modern economy. Whilst companies and related 
organizations, such as NGOs, come in many forms, under most legal systems all are 
underpinned by explicit contracts.2 The advent of DLTs and smart contracts allows firms to 
embed financial contracts in technological products, where the financial component is 
operationalized by a cryptographic protocol. This is a step beyond simply replacing a currency 
as a unit of exchange and inter-temporal transfer of value, but actually replaces the need for a 
legal medium to act as an enforcement mechanism for commercial contracts. 
We summarize our arguments on cryptographically enabled contracts via distributed 
ledgers and block chains as follows: 
 
1. Combinatorial and modular – unrestricted smart contracts are potentially ‘Turing Complete’, 
(or ‘Computationally universal’ that is simple modules can be combined to replicate algorithms 
of arbitrary complexity). Hence, a series of smart contracts can replicate any essential 
components needed to initiate an organization and appropriately redistribute property rights. 
2. Disruptive – DLTs and smart contracts provide opportunities and solutions to current 
requirements and creates opportunities to create entirely new requirements and entities. For 
example, the ability to add financial value to electronically mediated transactions without 
recourse to a currency backed by either a legal mechanism or a physical commodity (such as 
gold) managed by a central counter-party means that the concept of a financial intermediary is 
transformed into an
 
algorithm which simply requires some form of execution. 
3. Unruly — the very same Turing-completeness implies it is not possible to determine in advance 
and possibly in some automatic way whether a smart contract would have some desired 
properties3) and hence: 
(a) in the general case only the execution itself would determine what a contract outcome 
would be and the agreement between the counter-parties to continue to work on the actual 
                                                             
2 Some countries, North Korea and Belarus are key examples, do allow domestic firms to write explicit individual 
contracts, but manage all organizations through some centralized principles that amount to the same form. 
3 Rice’s theorem (Sipser 2012, Proof 5.28, pp. 243) states that no recursive program can take a non-trivial set of general programs 
(e.g. all versions of smart contracts populating a distributed ledger with an expressive programming language such as in 
Ethereum) and discriminate the subset of programs satisfying a non-trivial property (e.g. the
 
contracts guaranteeing an 
always or eventually positive return on investment). 
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ledger directly replaces the enforceability medium provided by a social planner to enable the 
nexus of
 
contracts that form firms. 
 
(b) as the contract execution is distributed to all entities of the DLTs the notion that a firm as a 
static representation of a nexus of contracts with persistent property rights becomes less 
important given the ability to recombine a new firm without costs but also without the 
certainty to hold on to assets or be accountable for liabilities. 
The radical, unruly nature of this innovation is well captured by the Ethereum Classic’s 
manifesto: 
By entering into contracts on Ethereum Classic, you can be certain that the network remains
 
neutral. The outcome of transactions will be dictated by code you voluntarily interact with. 
Unless explicitly defined by the contract code, there are no reversals, no undos, no opt-outs.  
Transactions are final; applications are unstoppable. 
We will show that the arguments above are: a) fundamentally disruptive to the current notions of 
how firms are formed and the meaning of destruction and recombination in this context; b) the types 
of recombination and disruption envisaged are real and that we are beginning to see examples of ad-
hoc firms appearing. Finally, we discuss, in some detail, examples of resistance and place some social 
welfare context on this innovation. 
 
2. Theory on Disruptive Technologies 
 
To discuss the innovation impact of DLTs and smart contracts it is useful to map the key interest 
groups and actors behind new and old payment transactions networks (PTNs for short) into the 
classical terminology from Alford (1977). Each PTN is characterized by a governance structure that 
places the actors within the PTN cohort in the position of “professional monopolists” in this financial 
system (Alford 1977, ch:xiv). In short, this position permits control over the “strategically structured 
interest” in relation to the resources and power dynamics of those leading financial systems (ibid.). 
Simply put, there exists “a continuing struggle between major structural interests
 
operating within 
the context of a market society” although first applied to the health care context,
 
this concept can be 
readily applied to the PTN system (ibid.). On one side, the “professional monopolists” control the 
PTN resources whilst the “corporate rationalizers” challenge their power (i.e. new entrants, lobbyists 
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and technological innovation), and finally the community population seek improved financial 
transactions (ibid.).  
The new developments have seen the introduction of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Ripple and 
centralized ledgers (for a non-technical survey see (Massacci et al. 2016, § 3-6)). Some of these 
proposals, e.g. Danezis and Meiklejohn (2015), offer only minimal innovation and maintain the 
monopolist status quo in the financial sector. Other proposals have the capacity to be disruptive
 
to 
the order within the financial sector, displacing the need for controlled PTN and creating an
 
autonomous, self-organizing alternative that would be governed by and serve the community 
population. To examine the level of potential disruption to the financial industry posed by innovation 
and technologies our discussion will explore the innovation literature. In addition, we shape our 
 
 
 
Figure 1 (De)Regulation and Innovation Matrix 
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Note. Adapted from Henderson and Clark (1990). 
 
discussion looking at the interaction of disruptive technologies and combinatorial innovations and 
modularity to emphasize the super modularity surrounding DLTs, smart contracts and the resultant 
impact on structured interests. 
 
2.1. Disruptive Innovation 
 
Prior to the introduction of the term ‘disruptive innovation’ (Christensen and Snyder 1997), there were 
forerunning ideas such as Schumpeter (1942) creative destruction, a theory heavily influenced by Marxian 
destructive forces theory linked to the concept of the owners of production dictating innovation and change 
(i.e., professional monopolizers). In the 1980’s we progressed to Henderson and Clark (1990) model of 
radical innovation (see Figure 1 above). Here, the authors explain the difference between incremental to 
radical innovations linked to how the knowledge component of an innovation
 
impacts on the existing 
(architectural) levels of knowledge.  
What we can observe from Figure 1 above, is that the definition of ‘unruly’ innovation is hard to 
comprehensively describe, i.e. how does this differ from radical? Clarification is required in terms of 
developments in this field since the 1990’s, more specifically Christensen and Snyder (1997) The 
Innovator’s Dilemma cemented the term ‘disruptive innovation’ which became synonymous with  his name. 
Yet, to date there is much debate in the literature regarding the definition and differences between disruptive 
technology and disruptive innovation (Danneels 2004, Markides 2006). As we will argue in the rest of the 
paper, unruly innovation moves innovation outside the broad rules of the market that even ‘radical 
innovation’ do not completely break. 
We start our review by illustrating Christensen’s perspective. Christensen and Snyder (1997) 
postulated that when individuals or a firm embark on a new innovation irrespective of the target 
market, the route is uncertain and can be viewed as a journey into the unknown, a non-linear path 
gradually progressing from chaos to order. Hence, the introduction of a disruptive technology or 
disruptive innovation is a change that helps create a new market and value network, and eventually 
goes on to disrupt existing networks in an unanticipated (chaotic and complex) manner. Although, 
Christensen introduced the term ‘disruptive innovation’ he argued that this was a more 
comprehensive terms as he espoused that technologies in themselves are rarely intrinsically 
disruptive; rather, when technology is linked to an organization’s business model, it is the latter 
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model that
 
enables the disruptive impact in creating a new organization order i.e., unit. 
Linked to the above debate, in examining the broader literature the terms disruptive technology 
and innovation are widely cited interchangeably in the business and technology literature to capture 
innovations that emerge into a market or industry and invoke change (Yu and Hang 2010). One of 
the key findings of Christensen’s work is that disruptive technological innovations eventually grow 
to dominate the market (i.e., Apple’s ascent over Nokia). Christensen and Raynor (2003a, p.70) make 
this point forcefully by arguing that “disruption is a process and not an event, it might take decades 
for the forces to work their way through an industry but [they] are always at work.”
 
Similarly, 
Danneels (2004, p.247) summarised existing theory on disruptive innovation by pointing out that 
“disruptive technologies tend to be associated with the replacement of incumbents by entrants.”  If 
correct, such a fact carries serious implications for incumbent firms that a firm’s only option is to 
accept the disruption and proceed to exploiting the opportunity it presents. Christensen and Raynor 
(2003) suggested that established companies could exploit a disruption only by creating a separate 
unit. If we apply the arguments reviewed thus far to DLTs, we can see how DLTs redefine the concept 
of a firm as the innovation nexus, as Christensen argues relative to the firm’s business model driving 
innovation and creating units. Rather through cryptographic protocols, a nexus of financial contracts 
are embedded in technological products, this disrupts both the market and value network created 
(according to Christensen) and the current dominant actors in the financial system (i.e., removing 
the monopolists legal control). 
Turning to reviewing mainstream technological innovation studies there is clear demarcation 
between two types, with the caveat of adopting different terminologies for different stages in history. 
Simply put, i) revolutionary, discontinuous, breakthrough, radical, emergent or step function 
technologies and ii) evolutionary, continuous or incremental technologies (Florida and Kenney 
1990); (Morone 1993); (Christensen et al. 1998). If we refer back to Henderson and Clark (1990) 
modular vs architectural innovation model (see Figure 1 above) the authors were able to move 
beyond these two categories and explore the causes of failure in firms as the result of core 
technological
 
innovations companies with strong competences in component technologies might 
ignore the competitive implications of the architecture changes. Hence, the architectural innovation 
theory made the contribution of explaining competency-enhancing or destroying theory was not 
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accounted for in the literature at that stage. 
Likewise, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) is also useful in expanding the above categories 
to understand disruptive technological and innovation effects on firm’s operating systems. PET has 
three major components, which are: (i) deep structure, (ii) equilibrium periods, and (iii) 
revolutionary periods (Gersick 1991). Deep structure is the set of fundamental “choices a system
 
has 
made of (1) the basic parts into which its units will be organised and (2) the basic activity pattern 
that will maintain its existence” (Gersick 1991, p.14). The deep structure can be seen as the basic 
design or architecture of the firm and during equilibrium periods this basic design or architecture of 
the firm remains the same, consisting of maintaining and carrying out the choices represented in this 
basic design (i.e., sustaining according to Christensen). During this period, innovation is incremental 
in nature, to compensate for internal and external fluctuations without affecting the deep structure 
(i.e., ‘business as usual’). Gersick (1991) also notes that the pursuit of deep structure choices may 
result in behaviour that is turbulent on the surface. Hence, the deep structure generates strong 
inertia that prevents the generation of alternative deep structures, or disruptive innovation to 
fundamentally change the firm. 
2.2. DLTs Disruptive Innovation in the Context of the Firm 
 
In the firm context, the process of the introduction of DLTs can be interpreted as follows. The deep 
structure of the firm refers the firm’s core, which according to McKinsey’s 7S model, is the firm’s culture 
(i.e., shared values). This interpretation is shared by Hannan and Freeman (1984), who argue that the most 
important element of the firm is its mission, which is culturally determined and a shared value (or raison 
d’etre) of the firm. During the equilibrium period, the elements of the firm  converge  around  its  mission  or  
core,  the  firm’s  strategy,  structure,  staff,  systems,  skills,  style,  and
 
stakeholders. At this stage, all the 
elements (components) of the firm’s configuration become more
 
tightly coupled and increase efficiency. 
Yet, a side-effect of this process is reduced effectiveness as the organisation becomes more and more inert 
(i.e., inflexible). At a certain point, the organisation is no longer able to adapt to its changing environment, 
the introduction of disruptive technology such as DLTs. Misalignment ensues, increasing firm tension, 
conflict, resistance and stress. The crisis emerges where the deep structure needs to be dismantled 
(voluntarily or forcefully) in order to adapt or self-organise to the new requirements driven by 
environmental pressure, if the firm wishes to survive (i.e., a short revolutionary period). DLTs present this 
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pressure by fundamentally restructuring financial contracts, use of cryptocurrencies and can be used to 
create Decentralised
 
Autonomous Organizations. In Figure 2 we outline the current proposals for using 
DLTs in financial services. Here we see a centrally banked RTGS system supplying legal tender that is 
exchanged for ledger tokens. These ledger tokens are applied to a number of areas. In red there is a DAO, 
which 
 
Figure 2 A Collection of DAOs Operating on a DLT platform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The black lines in the background represent connections between ledgers. Red and blue represent the most  
complex smart contracts. Green and orange the simplest. Components can migrate and attach themselves to 
the
 
ledger then detach and discontinue for negligible cost in both directions. 
 
replicates the financial contract side of a regular firm. In green is a pure cryptocurrency like Bitcoin that  
can  act  as  a  store  of  value,  by  exchanging  centrally  banked  money  for  computational  effort. In dark 
blue we outline three different types of capital market, first a continuous double auction for standardized 
securities (like stock market), an over-the-counter market for non-standardized assets (housing, debentures) 
and a venture capitalist market for supplying entrepreneurs. In each case the DLT acts as a means of 
ensuring that transactions have the integrity and permanence required for standard activities. 
Returning to Christensen, his theory received some support while proposing their own slightly different 
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views. For example, Adner (2002) identified that a critical reason for the switch of consumer choices from 
sustaining to disruptive innovation was the decreasing marginal utility from the performance improvements 
in major dimensions, in addition to the new value propositions and affordable prices discussed by 
Christensen. Meanwhile, others criticised the vagueness of the concept of disruptive innovation. Danneels 
(2004), (see above) suggested that several authors seemed to think that Christensen did not provide a precise 
and consistent definition of the term disruptive technology. Tellis (2006) challenged that it would be very 
difficult to differentiate underperforming technologies from a technology with inferior performance but 
finally ending up being disruptive.  
Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) contribution introduces an innovation measure to include high-end as 
well as low-end disruptions, provides a more general view of disruptiveness of innovations
 
and explores 
beyond the case of low price/low performance. Disruptive innovation (having inferior performance in 
traditional attributes) with a high price, which Govindarjan and Kopalle referred to as high end, is not 
explored within Christensen’s theory. In Figure 3 below, the authors use cellular phones to exemplify the 
above theoretical issue to highlight the trade-off between relatively high priced goods versus convenience 
and portability (e.g., iPhones retail at USD600-800 per unit). Over time, cellular technology improved in 
providing reliable coverage at a reasonable cost to satisfy consumer demand, causing the disruption. 
According to this study, a disruptive innovation should (i) be inferior on the attributes that mainstream 
customers value; (ii) offer new value propositions
 
to attract a new customer segment or the more price 
sensitive mainstream market; (iii) be sold at a lower price; and (iv) penetrate the market from niche 
to mainstream, still placing the firm as the innovation nexus (Yu and Hang 2010). 
 
2.3. Unruly Innovation as Disruption of the Rules of the Market 
 
To support our argument that DLTs go beyond the firm as the nexus of innovation it is necessary to 
define innovation in the literature by way of illustrating the difference DLTs pose. Sustaining 
innovation is a journey that creates better products at a higher premium to attractive customers. 
According to Christensen and Snyder (1997), incumbents tend to prevail in such circumstances.
 
Disruptive innovation is oriented towards commercialising a simpler or more convenient product, 
aimed at new or unattractive customer sets for a lower premium (see below, cellular phone 
innovation). This would favor new market entrants beating the incumbents. In short, there are 
several 
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    Figure 3 Product-wise innovation 
 
 
Note. This concept is extended from Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006): sustaining innovation moves in time 
along a given performance trajectory, for example by improving the performance of a product in time (blue solid 
line), or by reducing its price (dotted line). Disruptive innovation create new performance paths (green solid line) 
or new price curves (dotted green lines) that are in alternative to existing products. However neither of them 
substantially changes the market demand. Unruly innovation can also change the market behavior as a whole, 
and thus generate a shifting market demand (coiled line). 
 
business examples where the dominant companies suffer from a flux of such products, start-ups 
attack established competitors, they disrupt them the caveat being that not all innovation stems from 
start-ups.  
The first aspect of the model illustrates the customers’ ability to utilise improvement as a single 
line. Yet, Christensen acknowledged that in reality, customers are distributed around the median 
shown. Hence, there are many such lines, or tiers in a market that customers will occupy illustrated 
by the distribution curve (right). Interpreting the model, this complies to management practice of 
managing stakeholders expectations whereas, the introduction of DLTs proposed in this study 
changes the customer role such that customers can define financial contracts within technology and 
self-organise. One consideration from this model is that in introducing new technology for PTNs, 
customers’ ability to utilise the DLTs and options such as Bitcoin is taken into account for disruption 
to occur in the current financial system.  
A significant difference in the introduction of DLTs as a disruptive innovation is that contrary to 
Christensen and Snyder (1997) distinction between sustaining and disruptive innovation, targeting 
the different customer tiers, the appeal would be universal. Not only would there be a trade-off in 
terms of other benefits, typically innovations are simpler to use, more convenient and usually less 
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expensive (i.e., removal of transaction charges applied by banks), this model does not account for the 
modularity aspect of DLTs, decoupling and dismantling the old order and creating sub-systems of 
systems (i.e., payment options outside of firms as the innovation nexus).  
In particular, DLTs differ from the current disruptive innovation literature regards the concept
 
of 
modularity or the intentional decoupling of interoperating systems-systems of a larger system 
(Tiwana 2008: 769-70). Linked to our previous discussion of decoupling and PET, the notion of 
modularity adopts a complex systems approach in that the system is more than a sum of its 
constituent parts and can adapt to working interdependently or independently with the ability to 
combine or re- combine in a self-organising manner to support the ‘whole’ (Karim 2006). In the 
business context, this can be witnessed in interfirm partnerships and collaboration. What DLTs offer 
is we contend ‘supermodularity’ by creating decoupled autonomous subsystems that connect to a 
larger system defined and created outside the existing financial system structure. This establishes a 
different interoperating model facilitating communication, exchange of payment and
 
functionality 
for the community of users.  
Christensen and Raynor (2003b, p.39) espoused that a key question for disruptive innovation: 
“it is a story of rational managers facing the innovator’s dilemma: Should we invest to protect the 
least profitable end of our business, so that we can retain our least loyal, most price-sensitive 
customers? Or should we invest to strengthen our position in the most profitable tiers of our business, 
with customers who reward us with premium prices for better products?” 
The authors continued to examine (part of our discussion in this paper) the potential for Internet 
Banking and subsequent technological development, interestingly at that time it was argued that
 
disruption using this technology was not perceived as possible (Christensen and Raynor 2003b). The 
rationale behind this claim included several reasons; i) an insufficient large population who have the 
skill or money to open an account and, ii) banks penetration level is high which rules out new-market 
disruption for Internet banking. However, as we have shown the issue raised around innovation in 
this arena is the notion that through supermodularity a range of diverse customers can remove the 
need for bank account privileges and features at a low service price in adopting DLTs (i.e., no fees or 
need to move banking provider). Hence, disruption as a theory, a “conceptual model of cause and 
effect that makes it possible to better predict the outcomes of competitive battles in different 
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circumstances” is challenged by DLTs innovation as there are a plethora of asymmetrical levels of 
motivation users and economic implications from the decoupling of the current system and creating 
multiple combinatory subsystems revolving around the movement and payment of money (ibid, 
p.40). 
This extension of modular innovation models for DLTs to supermodularity will require new 
knowledge for one or more components whilst the architectural knowledge necessarily has to 
change (i.e., the financial system). As industries have evolved the buyer-supplier relationships have 
progressed to increasingly modular products leading to shifts towards agile and disaggregated 
supply chains (Langlois and Robertson 1992, Zenger and Hesterly 1997, Schilling and Steensma 
2001). Innovation is the modular sense has witnessed low modularity products being tailored to 
meet customer expectations of a product which can necessitate an upskill effect in the customer’s 
product to match the component(s) technological development (self-organizing system). Examining 
highly modular components as provided in DLTs enables components to be incorporated into 
multiple end products (e.g., embedding financial contracts, etc.) with little impact on the component 
or end-product in allowing the transfer of monies (Ducy et al. 2000). Indeed, viewed from this 
perspective, supermodularity creates supply chain flexibility in the financial industry by reducing 
the need for interfaces between the banking system, community in receipt and component suppliers 
(Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). In short, the opportunity presented in adopting different DLTs and
 
PTNs raises the issue of changing the models of disruptive innovation and decoupling the power and 
governance currently embedded by the professional monopolisers in the current financial PTNs 
towards a more emergent and self-organising subsystem of payment transfer. 
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Table 1 Disruptive criteria sheet for DLTs (entrant) 
 
 
Phase    Criterion                                             Evaluation  
Foothold 
market 
entry 
Products  perform  worse  based  on 
established  attributes 
 
Products are cheaper, simpler, more 
comfortable or more reliable 
Products address current non- 
consumers 
Profitable  business  model  targeting 
over-satisfied customers 
Fulfilled:  Low  transaction  throughput  and 
financial services as well as supports are limited. 
 
Fulfilled: Easy to deploy and scale, better user 
privacy, higher fault-tolerance. 
Fulfilled: Customers who want better privacy 
will seek to use DLTs. 
Unknown 
Investors allow experimentation Fulfilled: Many projects funded and launched: 
HyperLedger, Ripple, Ethereum. Bank of Eng- 
land calls for centrally-banked cryptocurrency 
(RSCoin). 
Main mar- 
ket entry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure of 
incumbent 
Products are based on standard com- 
ponents 
 
Strategic resources (licenses, capital, 
etc.) are accessible 
Network for PDI is expected to be 
large 
PDI is compatible with existing net- 
work 
 
Business model is significantly differ- 
ent 
 
Processes are significantly different
  
 
Value network has a low overlap 
Fulfilled: Well studied components are used such 
as cryptography, distributed system, and digital 
time-stamping. 
Fulfilled:  Mostly  open  source  software  and 
cheap hardware. 
Fulfilled: Widely deployed communication net- 
work (the Internet). 
Unfulfilled:  Only  some  credit-backing  cryp- 
tocurrencies such as RSCoin or Ripple are back- 
ward compatible with central bank currency. 
Fulfilled: Central Authority is removed. 
 
 
 Fulfilled: Peers work together to keep record of the 
ledgers. 
 
Unfulfilled:  there are central bank currency that back 
cryptocurrencies such as RSCoin or Ripple. 
 
DLTs with smart contracts evaluated against phases and criteria from Govindarajan and Kopalle 
(2006).
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DLTs, even at a cursory glance, fit the model of a disruptive innovation. Table 1 above, 
reviews the
 
features of a DLT from Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) viewpoints of 
foothold, main market
 
dominance and failure to the incumbent to illustrate such potentiality. 
2.4. Framing FinTechs DLTs as Actors in Financial Markets 
 
Financial markets are inextricably linked to the social where economic actors (i.e. investors, 
traders, institutions and so on) can impact governments and national economies (see Cetina 
and Preda (2007) for a sociological history of financial markets). Claiming that DLTs and smart-
contract could yield to self-organisation of financial markets and systems seems at odd with 
the normally intended notion of economic actor. This definition has been widely debated (See 
for example Callon (1998) vs Miller (2002)). A consensus has emerged that actors are not 
“made up of human bodies[. . . ] technical devices, algorithms” Callon and Muniesa (2005, 
p.1230): ‘agencement’ or  sociotechnical combinations. Hence our claim is that the 
deployment of smart contracts on a DAO is just such extension: once contracts are 
automatically executed they become actors. Cetina and Preda (2007, p.126) move the 
agencement debate forward in exploring how architectural changes (See Figure 1) have 
occurred so that a market “is stable only long enough to enable transactions to occur and 
changes with transactions.” However at the time of writing, no method of a “superordinate 
mechanism that reflects all the information in a network and makes it available simultaneously 
to all concerned” existed (ibid.). DLTs and DAO constitute the essential game changer that 
allows to move FinTech innovation from architectural to radical and eventually to unruly (See 
again Figure 1). Indeed, DLTs have the potential to be what (MacKenzie 2008: 13) termed 
“effective” or “Barnesian” performativity (the actual realization of the market is much closer to 
the economic theory that describes it). A topical example is the authentic distributed nature of 
a DLTs implementing a financial market (Massacci et al. 2017a) as described in the theory 
Spulber (1996) as opposed to the actual implementation which requires the mediation of the 
Exchange Harris (2003). At the same time they have features that makes their nature counter 
performative (less likely to adhere to the process descripted by the theory) such as the finality 
of code execution: there cannot be a legal interpretation as code is law (Lessig 1999) Our key 
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observation borrowed from MacKenzie (2008) is that the properties of artefacts, technological 
systems, are not ‘details’ that FinTech analyses could set aside, as those technological aspects 
may be such that new and alternative forms of organization become possible. 
 
3. Disruption by changing the FinTech game 
 
The classic paradigm suggests that a disruptive technology is something that does something 
that dominates all incumbents in several dimensions. Indeed, this sits within a classic economic
 
paradigm of substitutable goods, if a form of consumption can be provided more cheaply or be 
fully dominated by a good that offers far more dimensions to consumption within a similar cost 
frame then it is disruptive, with Nokia versus Apple a typically cited example. 
Table 2 Conceptual Differences Between Types of Innovation 
 
Context Incremental Disruptive Radical Game Changer 
Components Streamline and Cheaper possibly New  capability  on New framework, no 
 simplification compatible existing framing backward compatibility 
Modularity Bespoke   to   plug- Combinatorial Extending the cur- Combinatorial, but not 
 in  within  existing  rent configuration with previous modules 
 frameworks    
Competition Standardized  sub- Monopoly Limited Monopoly 
 stitutes    
Regulation Mature Unknown Within norms None 
Fixed Costs Low Unknown High None 
Cultural Overlooked Immediate Overlooked Invasive 
Consumption Same as before Extended Extended New 
Resistance Low High Low Intended, but difficult 
     
 
However, we introduce a new form of disruption which we call ‘changing the game’. This is not 
about adding features (dimensions) to the consumption of a good, or providing an equivalent 
consumption at a cheaper price, it is simply a wiping of the board that re-shapes the entire FinTech
 
spectrum.  
These issues are also found in the standard critique of the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma problem. 
Binmore (2007) notes that many commentators on Merrill Flood, Melvin Dresher and Albert W. 
Tucker’s original thought experiment vehemently disliked the no-cooperation solution. However, all 
explanations for why ‘their’ formulations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with a cooperative solution is 
an acceptable one amount to the same thing: the game is changed. For instance, the players 
“knowing”
 
that the other will not defect, or that there was utility to be gained for acting altruistically. 
Simply, the landscape of the entire economic interaction is changed to reveal an alternative solution.  
When a technology changes the landscape of economic activity, it is essentially changing the 
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parameters of the game. Very few technologies can claim this feature and most that do are a nexus 
of classical disruptive innovation and combinatorial innovation. For instance, the introduction of 
interchangeable machined parts allowed mechanization to enter every aspect of the production and
 
consumption cycle that underpinned the industrial revolution. 
Table 2 above presents a conceptual dichotomy of changing the game in comparison to 
incremental, disruptive and radical innovation. 
3.1. Resistance and changing the game? 
 
We  suggest  that  the  reason  a  new  mode  of  innovation  needs  to  be  delineated  is  a  function 
of  the  variation  in  fixed  costs,  cultural  impact,  variation  in  consumption  and  the  ability  to 
resist, both by society and incumbents. In reverse order, when a new potentially disruptive 
technology is innovated, resistance by incumbents is to be expected. However, the benefit to society 
may be such (indeed is the norm) that social planner mechanisms are not enacted to mitigate the 
disruption.
 
In certain cases, and we will illustrate some of them in our next context, it might
 
be 
desirable to hobble the innovation through the actions of a social planner to reduce or eliminate the 
disruption on incumbents. Three recent innovations, IR tagging of freight to improve electronically 
managed supply chains, algorithmic analysis of individual consumption patterns by retailers and high 
frequency trading are examples where social planners have enacted mechanisms to deliberately 
reduce the effectiveness of the technology to meet the requirements of society, see for instance 
Securities and Exchange Commission (2014). A changing of the game, is a case whereby a social 
planner cannot prevent the innovation from reshaping the economic landscape.
  
What is the mechanism that prevents regulatory action? We posit three domains that need to 
converge for this to occur. First consumption. The innovation must provide a new mechanism for 
consumption that differs from existing consumption paradigms. For instance, certain 
cryptocurrencies permit the exchange of value without any centrally banked oversight, hence the 
economy supported by these transactions is essentially dark to the rest of the regulated economy, 
where money has some traceability. Whilst a black economy obviously existed before DLT 
enabled cryptocurrencies, the medium of exchange was still via centrally banked money, hence the 
problem was information processing by enforcement and not existential, cryptographically enabled 
transactions of the correct type cannot be tracked and their existence in law is debatable, it is 
essentially a
 
recorded agreement between individuals that is carefully ledgered. 
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Culturally, changing the game technologies are invasive. That is the recognition that they are being 
used is normally overlooked and the cultural landscape changes in a way that is gradual, but 
essentially irreversible. For instance, children begin to use money ledgered in interconnected games 
to substitute for real transactional exchanges. This is a centralized ledger, but a distributed one could 
be provided for essentially no cost and the very act of migration gradually destroys the previous 
economic paradigm. More pertinently, if a firm provides a mechanism for real time gross cash 
settlement that can be exchanged externally for centrally banked money, but only requires a 
modicum of commitment to providing computational capacity to record their ledgers (for instance
 
on connection per transaction), then firms will gradually migrate to this platform and eventually
 
kill  
the  incumbents  (monolithic  PTNs).  This leads us to the final element, fixed costs.  When a 
technological innovation has fixed and abatement costs close to zero the diffusion to the technology 
has no financial obstacles.  
Most firms already either have in house, or buy in substantial computing power, some of which is 
unused. Simple implementation of the protocols for DLTs allows the firm to flexibly choose when 
to conduct a transaction and/or axiomatize contractual structures within the firm. Furthermore, unlike 
radical innovation with a high impact on component and architectural knowledge, a changing of the 
game is a mechanism of ‘normalizing’ complex process into simple ones, that can be viewed as easily 
conducted by the individual or individual organization. For instance, the process of conducting 
financial transactions could be viewed as a high knowledge, high fixed cost problem that is best dealt 
with by specialist intermediaries. Similarly, the mechanism of conceiving an organization as a nexus 
of contracts requires a highly structured set of legal mechanisms that interact with a social planners 
laws to allow the concrete creation of the firm as an entity. Modular smart contracts ‘normalize’ this 
mechanism such that the creation, running and dissolution of a firm is a costless sequence that is 
anticipated to be transitory, than presumed to be persistent. 
 
4. The Rise of the DAO and Inevitable Risks 
 
A DAOs is simply a cryptographically enabled nexus of contracts that codifies an entity that  is 
autonomous, in the sense of the legal framework is cryptographically codified. In Table A in the 
appendix we outline some core components of a transaction mechanism involved in a 
cryptographically enabled PTN. As previously noted once an electronic action has a ‘real’ financial 
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value attached to it then much more complex contractual arrangements can be enabled and codified. 
Bitcoin, https://bitcoin.org, is the first and most successful payment DAO. Furthermore, several 
simple extensions of a payment DAO can also be directly implemented in Bitcoin using its (non-
Turing-complete) scripting language. Bitcoin script supports variable and constant declarations, 
basic arithmetic operations, and evaluations of hash and signature as well as two time constraint 
operators. As such, simple applications such as external financial data source, crowdfunding, escrow, 
intermediated payment, fair lotteries, etc. are possible with Bitcoin scripts (Atzei et al. 2018). 
Similarly, Stellar, https://www.stellar.org, is a payment DAO but it additionally features 
multisignature that requires multiple signers, and allows the creation of more complex smart 
contracts. However, it is only until the launch of Ethereum, https://www.ethereum.org that smart 
contracts can be fully developed using a Turing-complete language.  
Since the launch of Ethereum in 2013, we have witnessed many other similar smart contract 
platforms for DAO. The noticeable new platforms are listed in Table 3. Just to highlight a few among 
them: (1) NEO, https://neo.org, which is also dubbed the Chinese Ethereum4, reaches 1000 
transactions/second (TPS) while Ethereum is still struggling with scalability issue5; (2) STRAT, 
https://stratisplatform.com, a “Blockchain as a Service” platform that is tailor made for enterprises 
to create their own custom decentralized applications; and (3) EOS, https://eos.io, which focuses on 
providing toolboxes for decentralized applications development such as shared databases, 
authentication systems, account recovery, cloud storage and hosting, scaling, all paid with EOS 
tokens. 
  
                                                             
4 NEX, https://neonexchange.org/, is featured as an effi cient decentralized exchange while RedPulse, https:// 
www.redpulse.com, is considered the “next generation intelligence and content ecosystem for China markets”. 
5 Ethereum has plan to shift from the heavy Proof-of-Work mechanism to the lightweight Proof-of-Stake mechanism
 
but 
this is still under development. 
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Table 3 Noticeable alternative DAO platforms in comparisons with Ethereum. 
 
 
Platform  URL Enhanced Features 
 
 
NEO https://neo.org/ offers high throughput (1000 TPS) 
STRAT https://stratisplatform.com/ offers “Blockchain as a Service”, specially 
design for 
private and custom enterprise DAOs 
EOS https://eos.io/ offers extended toolboxes for decentralized 
applica- tions development 
LISK https://lisk.io/ allows side chains alongside with a main 
chain for independent transactions 
processing 
WAVES https://wavesplatform.com/ allows multiple tokens development and 
provides a 
seamless tokens exchange mechanism 
Chainlink https://www.smartcontract.com/link offers external data sources for smart 
contracts 
 
 
 
4.1. Case Study: Ethereum and the implications of codification 
The first DAO and the platform on which it was built provides a useful example of the dangers 
associated with such entities. Ethereum is a scripting language (the platform) that runs off a core 
engine called the Ethereum Virtual Machine, this is the scaleable distributed infrastructure that 
allows the contracts written in the scripting language to be executed. Unlike Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies Ethereum is built from scratch in terms of contracts, that trade tokens (called) ether 
transactions on which are stored on a distributed ledger run on the hardware provided by the 
participants in the project. Ethereum was started in 2013, by cryptographers and has market 
capitalization of $1 billion as of December 2016. The path of Ethereum is naturally uncertain as one 
of the key features of a platform is that unwinding it should be as natural as creating it, given the low 
frictions for both actions. 
Key points, to join an Ethereum DAO you simply need to implement the protocol, demonstrate 
some proof of effort or exchange centrally banked money, then proceed to write smart contracts that 
‘do’ certain things, such as distributing money contingent on some external input. This could be a 
contingent claim, like a financial derivative, or in response to some form of effort, such as building 
some software or some other tangible activity that can be verified cryptographically. An example 
could be that a truck driver delivering some goods takes a photograph of the stars or some 
geographical landmark then the pictures are ‘hashed’ so that a complex algorithm is solved (this 
algorithm should be time dependent) with an easily verifiable solution. So the proposer has to expend 
computational effort to prove their ‘state’. The smart contract in the DAO then rebalances the ledger 
to reflect this state and its implications for other agents in the ledger. So in the truck driver case the 
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verification releases a payment that the driver can exchange for centrally banked money or keep in 
the DAO for storage. 
The contracts build in Ethereum can be ‘very’ smart, indeed, a key claim of the scripting language 
is that it is Turing complete. A Turing complete programming language sits at the very top of the 
complexity scale. That is for any non-trivial algorithm there is no automatic mechanism that can 
check all of the possible outcomes of an algorithm that it designed in that language. Hence, a clever 
programmer can effectively design any type of organization that can be imagined, as in this case the 
language is in the form of codified clauses within contracts. 
On the practical usage of Ethereum smart contracts, (Bartoletti and Pompianu 2017) demonstrates 
that they have been used for various application categories: (1) financial applications, which is the 
original intention; (2) notary, in which the smart contract is used to persist data like photos, music, 
messages, etc.; (3) games of chance (Dice, Roulette, RockPaperScissor) and some other simple 
games based on skill (Etherization, PRNG challenge); (4) wallets which specialize in managing keys, 
signatures, transactions; and (5) advanced programming libraries for smart contract development, 
e.g. math, string processing, etc. 
The codification of laws is a popular conceit in the legal literature, with foundational contributions 
from Lessig (1999, 2009), Perritt (2000) that warn of the implications of legal mechanisms enshrined 
in computer code. A key component of our legal infrastructure is Tort or Delict recourse within a 
civil framework. When a contract is disputed the counter-parties to the contract dispute their case to 
some impartial adjudicator who acts with the authority of society to ‘fairly’ resolve disputes, 
interpreting the clause structure of the contract. The adjudicator then has the authority to place 
economic and physical sanction on an individual or entity if the adjudicator’s proposed remediation 
is not enforced. Whilst this obviously can happen in our real world setting, in a codified system there 
is no method of enacting remediation than that which the original algorithm intended. Hence, when 
building a DAO safety is most certainly not guaranteed, indeed to replicate the complexity of normal 
organizations, this feature is a necessity. 
Indeed, a recent survey on the security of Ethereum smart contracts (Atzei et al. 2017: 21) has 
pointed out that “the difficulty of detecting mismatches between their intended behaviour and the 
actual one” has been the main cause of smart contract vulnerabilities. The authors suggested that 
non-Turing complete and human-readable languages are preferable for specific domain applications 
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as “the choice of using a Turing-complete language limits the possibility of verification” (ibid: 21). 
A comprehensive list of discovered smart contract vulnerabilities such as variables type cast, ether 
lost in transfer, etc. can be found in the aforementioned survey (ibid.). Furthermore, DAO 
vulnerabilities cannot be treated as “normal” security vulnerabilities. As it is shown in (Massacci et 
al. 2017b), security and economics are one for DAOs: the failure of a security property, e.g. 
anonymity, can destroy a DAO because economic attacks can be tailgated to security attacks and 
there is no possible technical fix for the DAO as we will see in the following discussion. 
An organization called ‘The DAO’, which was one of the first DAOs built in a smart contract 
enabled DLT. At a peak the value of ‘The DAO’ was about $100 million, stored entirely in Ethereum 
currency units. The objective of the DAO was to create a venture capitalist fund designed to initiate 
other projects and demonstrate the creation of DAOs, see daohub.org. 
As noted, distributed ledges are specifically designed to make it impossible for individual parties 
(or even a large set thereof) to tamper the sequence of transactions recorded in the ledger. However, 
an unknown individual, exploited the Turing completeness of the contract to construct a routing of 
transactions in the ledger that allowed that individual to take control of a large proportion of the 
invested capital (resulting in a final loss of about $3.8 million, see https://forum.daohub.org/t/scam-
and-suspicious-project-list/6757). The transactions were legitimate, in the sense that they were 
allowable under the initial coding of the DAO. However, the money was not used in the real world 
for the venture capitalist objectives envisioned by the creators of the organization. 
Hence, in the attempt to reverse the DAO financial crisis, Ethereum designers proposed a solution 
outside the protocol itself: encourage parties to upgrade to a protocol client version that makes it 
impossible for the “hacker” to monetize the solution. This solution illustrate the true role that the 
Ethereum authors have in the game and that they have naively (or deliberately) downplayed: “Code 
is a regulator in cyberspace because it defines the terms upon which cyberspace is offered. And those 
who set those terms increasingly recognize the code as a means to achieving the behaviours that 
benefit them best.” 
The attempts to fix the ‘The DAO’ proved difficult as to rewrite the central nexus of contracts 
forming the organization requires the majority of members to agree and this level of cooperation 
proved elusive. Indeed, a large fraction of the members of the Ethereum Community refused to join 
25  
the new redressed ledgers, issued a Declaration of Independence6 and continued to maintain the 
“classic” ledger: 
Let it be known to the entire world that on July 20th, 2016, at block 1,920,000, we as a community 
of sovereign individuals stood united by a common vision to continue the original Ethereum 
blockchain that is truly free from censorship, fraud or third party interference. 
Outside of the inherent instability of the ‘The DAO’ several further implications of its existence 
were stark. First, the organization was inherently stateless. Given the structure of contracts generating 
the DAO no state could reconstruct the ledger and hence could not identified payments or receipts 
between members for tax purposes or any other. This falls into the third point of danger in the Lessig 
(2009) classification, that entirely codified economic activity is inherently separate from the 
redistributive component of a firm’s economic interaction with society. 
‘The DAO’ was assembled in an ad-hoc fashion, investment in the venture capital projects 
agglomerated to ‘The DAO’ by simply implementing the protocol built in Ethereum and then 
exchanging the appropriate capital. The nexus of contracts then processed further payments and 
receipts from the venture capital component and redistributed them accordingly. The speed of the 
failure in the ‘The DAO’ does illustrate the risk of crashes. 
 
  5. A Geometric Interpretation Risk from Unruly Innovation 
The nature of innovation and the value and risks associated have been widely studied in the past 
using simple stochastic process to illustrate, geometrically, the nature of the risk vector. Levinthal 
(1991), Swaminathan (1996), Gimeno et al. (1997) and Denrell (2004) utilize a combination of 
random walks and martingale models of bets on future value to understand firm mortality within a 
stochastic framework. In our case we can model both the opportunity structure and the risk structure 
inherent to designing DAO within Turing complete frameworks, a modelling approach more akin to 
that suggested in Coad et al. (2013), for innovation and DeTienne et al. (2008) for risk bearing. To 
better understand the general nature of the risk and the dire fact that it is not eliminable we consider 
natural model of evolution of the market. Assume that an agent valuation of a DAO with M 
participants can be captured with a N-dimensional vector x(t,M) of ‘component evaluations’ of the 
                                                             
6 Available athttps://ethereumclassic.github.io/assets/ETC_Declaration_of_Independence.pdf. 
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DAO in the positive real space R+x N⇥RN which captures the evolution of the DAO in time and in 
the number of participants. In a financial market this could be the valuation of a particular asset 
through clearing the supply and demand of securities (For example see Massacci et al. (2017a) for 
distributed ledger implementation of a Futures Exchange). In a social network this could be total 
activity, number of adverts consumed and total trades. 
Our main assumptions are that the value of a DAO is built into the business model. Organizations 
can be constructed in an ad-hoc way with a specific set of objectives and assign ownership to digital 
assets in a manner similar to a nexus of contracts operating within a standard jurisdictional legal 
framework. However, we will then model the components of such a set of contracts as being designed 
to be Turing complete with dynamic updates. This offers a flexible mechanism for designing, 
combinatorially, new components and hence facilitating potentially disruptive innovation, but also 
has risk associated with unintended and potentially harmful execution, which proffers systemic risks 
to the organization, that destroy the DAOs asset values to its members. 
 
  5.1. The Model 
Assume that an agent valuation of a DAO with M participants can be captured with a Ndimensional 
vector x(t,M) of ‘component-evaluations’ of the DAO in the positive real space R+x N⇥RN which 
captures the evolution of the DAO in time and in the number of participants. In a financial market 
this could be the valuation of a particular asset through clearing the supply and demand of securities. 
In a social network this could be a series of attributes, such as total activity, number of adverts 
consumed and total trade. 
For each agent i ϵ . . .M there is a dimensional observed valuation vector which is a weighted sum 
of the state components, hence yi(t,M) =ꞷ(x(t,M), t,M), for a non-zero weighting function. For 
example ꞷ could be static and exponential affine, i.e. ꞷ(x(t,M), t,M) =exp(ꞷ′x(t,M)) for a non-zero 
vector ꞷ. This is a prototypical example in structured financial products. 
Beside the valuation function we need also to consider the presence of potentially undesirable 
states, or Hazards in which DAO’s evolution might be pushed by a number of malicious attackers H 
<M. The attackers have a corresponding hazardous region H(t,M) whereby H: R+x N⇥RN and such 
that if for some time t it is x(t,M)ϵH(t,M) then yi(t,x(t,M)) = 0 for all i = 1. . .M. In other words when 
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the functional DAO state enters the region H(t,M), the organization loses value to all participants. 
This is precisely what happened to ’The DAO’ as we discussed in §4. 
We make only a limited number of assumptions on the shape of this hazardous region (and the 
corresponding dual acceptable region). The first favourable assumption is that H(t,M) shrinks with 
time, i.e. H(t,M)⸧H(t +Ᵹ,M), as the designers and managers of the DAO fix bugs and push updates. 
A second favourable assumption is that the initial point of the domain x(0,M) is in the exterior of 
H(0,M) and the admissible region RN \H(t,M) is a convex open set around x(0,M). This condition 
could be overly optimistic for particularly sophisticated (or most likely buggy, see Atzei et al. (2017)) 
contracts as there could be subsets of H(t,M) that are enclaves inside the acceptable region so that an 
acceptable trajectory between two acceptable points might traverse some potentially unacceptable 
states. 
Our convexity conditions corresponds to the classical specification of security policies as specified 
by Schneider (2000) in which the legitimate execution is included into an envelope corresponding to 
the security policy and that can be guaranteed to stay within the region (if the security policy is 
decidable) by actually mediating any interaction of the DAO with external actors through general 
security monitor (Ngo et al. 2015) or, for only a very limited classes of programs, through mining 
behaviour (Jamrozik et al. 2016). Such envelope does not necessarily bound the acceptable evolution 
of the DAO7. A consequence of Schneider’s widely accepted definition of security policy is that if 
for some τ we have x(τ,M)ϵH(τ,M) then for all t ≥ τ we have x(t,M)ϵH(t,M) and hence our definition 
of RN \H(t,M) as a convex set.8 
At this point we need to capture the potential evolution of the function considering the potential 
actions of the attackers. The presence of a Turing complete language to specify smart contracts that 
could dynamically join the nexus means that it is not technically possible to actually construct the 
envelope of a security monitor or even a rewriter of contracts on the fly that could enforce a security 
policy (Hamlen et al. 2006) able to constrain the DAO behaviour within the acceptable region. In 
other words, by construction a general DAO is unruly. 
For example establishing an automatic test that would forbid the introduction into the DAO of 
                                                             
7 Consider as a 2-D example the area between the horizontal axis and the horizontal line crossing the y axis at 1. 
8 The presence of potential enclaves of H(t, M ) could be technically addressed by edit automata (Ligatti et al. 2005) 
which are able to correct potentially bad evolution that can become eventually good. However, they would not change. 
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smart (sub)contract by individual users if they can be so that yi(t,x(t,M)) ≤ 0 for some t would be in 
violation of Rice’s theorem as we could construct a recursive distinguisher for two not-trivial sets of 
programs (See discussion on Footnote 3). 
One could postulate that smart-contract developers could avoid using programming language 
features such as dynamic updates and reflection that would make the properties of the contracts 
undecidable and their behaviour unruly. All analysis of far less financially critical domains such a 
mobile apps or web sites have shown that developers have not restrained themselves from the use of 
dynamic, expressive features even when they would not need them (See for example Jensen et al. 
(2012) who quite appropriately joke about the ’evil’ that ’eval’, a Turing-complete but quite 
convenient construct, can wreak on the possibility of security analysis). 
DAO designers could also use formal methods to certify smart-contracts before admitting them to 
the DAO to prove that they satisfy some desirable property9. Unfortunately, what is considered 
practical’ in this domain would correspond to several days of analysis by large teams (See for 
example Acharya and Robinson (2011)), which would nullify the whole purpose of high speed 
distributed ledgers working at a speed of milliseconds as a way to automatically seize opportunities. 
To consider the law of motion for x(t) we can work with a general Brownian Semi-Martingale of 
the following form: At this point we need to capture two possible evolutions: the one captured by 
honest users who actually performs their intended innovative activities and the one of malicious users 
who try to push the evolution of the DAO towards the hazard regions H(t,M). In a distributed setting 
with sufficiently many actors M, it becomes impossible to distinguish possible evolution in which 
some actors push the state x(τ,M) in a region where yi(t,x(t,M)) = 0 for some (or all) i by honest albeit 
unfortunate behaviour (See how in Massacci et al. (2017a), the authors went to a great extent to 
address the risk of broke traders for a simple financial product without smart contracts). 
If an observer cannot likely tell a priori whether an action was innovative or malicious we can then 
model of innovative actions using the techniques suggest by Levinthal (1991) and Swaminathan 
(1996) to capture the evolution of the firm as well as its possible mortality. A natural solution in this 
setup is to capture movements in the RN as a random walk. Then, to capture the law of motion for 
x(t,M) we can consider the following decomposition: 
                                                             
99 This is not in contrast with undecidability results: once the program is fixed, and no too expressive construct is present, its 
analysis is doable but might still take exponentially long. 
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for a component j where W(t) −W(0) ~ N(0, tI) is, in its simplest form, a Weiner process for a N 
length null vector 0 and an identity matrix I. The drift function gj(t,M) may also be used to capture 
also potential discount factor that users may place on the evolution of the DAO. It is the ’intended’ 
value at the time of inception. The stochastic function W(t) corresponds to the movements of good 
(or bad) actors that exploit the flexibility of the DAO to move it do a different space point (e.g. one 
where yi(x(t+1,M), t,M)>yi(x(t,M), t,M) for some agent i. For simplicity in this treatment we will 
ignore jumps (which might corresponds to updates in functionalities) as the effect we want to 
measure is already present in their absence. 
The high level of indeterminacy derived by the number of agents (each of whom can introduce 
potentially arbitrary smart contracts) can be easily captured by assuming that . 
So that for example  (for network and power law effects) or 
 for supermodular effects. The drift function might also depend on M as the 
value of the network might also have network or effects. 
What can we say about hazard of the undesired functionality of the components when an increasing 
number of users enters the fray? First, clearly, as we increase the complexity, then the expected 
distance |x(t,M) − x(0,M)| increases, therefore the volume of space covered in RN\H(t,M) increases.  
It is then possible to prove that if the speed of expansion of H(t,M) is not sufficiently high in 
comparison to the variance of the random walk and H is sufficiently large then the process is 
inevitably going to hit the hazardous region with probability 1. 
 
  5.2. The simplest case: Weiner Process with knockout bound 
  From Itˆo calculus representation of a stochastic process, we know that if y(t)=ꞷ(x(t))=x(t) and the  
state variable is one dimensional then: To extract a value for the DOA in the derivation below we 
assume that there is only one dimension to evaluate. Then, from Itˆo calculus, we know that if y(t) 
=ꞷ(x(t)) then: 
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Hence the value function y(t) can be thought of as a commodity price that is a function of the 
community demand and the physical cost of generating the proof of swap within the virtual DAO 
community. Setting g(x(t))=r to be a positive constant rate of change in numéraire for which the 
assets within the DAO can be exchanged, then the simple: 
 
The right-hand-side of the PDE provides the valuation benchmark, indeed, for organizations where 
the knockout is a more abstract process than a simple dollar valuation, this can be replaced some 
other function, but for this simple illustration we will adhere to the standard interpretation that the 
organisation is valued against a complete market. 
A further simplifying assumption is that the evolution of patches is actually discrete and 
significantly slower than the pace of evolution which would be consistent with both theoretical 
models of patching strategies (see for example Cavusoglu et al. (2008)) and empirical models of 
attacks and countermeasures of IS (Ransbotham and Mitra 2009, August and Tunca 2011). Then we 
can assume that during the a period of evolution of x(t,M) the hazard region is essentially constant 
and therefore H(t,M) = [h,∞] for some hϵR+. Therefore the boundary condition becomes x(t)≥ h, 
y(t)=0, for some perpetual time frame. 
If we approximate the functional form of ꞷ(x(t)) = x(t)ꟹ then the present value of holding y(t) will 
be a solution of the form  , solved simultaneously with the PDE. This yields the 
result that when x(0)<h, we obtain the following valuation condition: 
 
As we can see if limM→∞ the valuation of y goes to zero as  corresponding to the 
intuition that with too many users it is essentially certain that the evaluation of y(t) will basically hit 
the hazard boundary sooner than later. However, this might be obfuscated for the initial smaller 
values of M by a large value of the drift value r. However, as the variance is squared, the random 
walk effect will eventually overwhelm the drift effect as M grows when more users join, this is 
illustrated in Figure 4. Notice that this is materially different from standard real option valuation 
models with knock outs where the intrinsic valuation of the implicit contract monotonically varies 
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with the state asset with the lowest positive value when state variable approaches the bound. 
However, in this case the highest value of the DAO is just prior to the hazard bound. 
 
 5.3. Jump diffusion in two dimensions with curved hazard geometries 
Clearly, the simplest form provides an intuitive representation of the different cases, but are 
unrealistic for anything but trivial value processes. Unfortunately, geometrically, most cases can only 
be solved by simulation and a further complication is that the hazard domain is not easily described 
(indeed for most Turing complete scripting languages it is impossible, by definition, to describe at 
inception).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Illustration of the expected private value of the DAO at inception y(0) with an upper knock-out 
bound. Here the DAO value y(t) is x(t) unless x(t)≥ h and then y(t) = 0. The owner of the contract is 
presumed to be able to liquidate the position at any time t, unless x(s)≥ h, then y(t) = 0, for t > s. 
 
In Figure 5, we show two different simulations for the two dimensional case of x(t,M). The hazard 
region of the components lies outside the unit circle and it is assumed to be relatively stationary (or 
move very slowly) during the observation period. We consider two possible diffusions with small 
discrete steps. The first (the blue line) has a lower continuous variance (a smaller number of 
participants), and the second, the red-line, with the same jump size and number of jump steps but 
larger continuous variance an If the number of participants is an itself an attractor for a much larger 
number of participants to flock in , then the variance of the DAO’s evolution 
increases super-linearly and the probability of hitting the hazard region increases. In contrast, the 
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possibility of pushing updates is normally slowed down by the number of users  as 
the DAO operators need to make sure the increasingly diverse number of legitimate users is not 
affected by the updated.  
Figure 5 Two Alternative Hazard Behaviors for Different Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Any point inside the sphere represent an acceptable status of the DAO. The red line is a possible 
system evolution. It has a large number of users and traverses the boundary after only a small number 
of iterations. The blue line has a lower variance (i.e. significantly less participants) and takes longer to 
avoid contact so that the hazard region could expand by security patching or deployed countermeasures. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
We argue that distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), block-chains and cryptographically enabled 
contracts (CryptoECs) are more than simply a disruptive technology for the financial sector replacing 
existing networks. Critically, we introduce a new notion to sit behind radical innovation, disruptive 
innovation and modular technologies. The notion of unruly innovation is that of an underlying 
economic framework, for which a hyper-disruptive technology essentially changes the complete 
economic architecture upon which organizations are built. This argument complements the existing 
models of disruption and radical innovation synchronizing these concepts with the economic concept 
of combinatorial innovation and super-modularity. A core characteristic of this type of disruption 
(which we refer to as ‘changing the game’, following the game theoretic insight) is that extremely 
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low fixed costs result in gradual adoption even if the social welfare paradigm seeks to place 
blocks in its path. This extremely low adoption cost is coupled with a gradual migration that is 
essentially irreversible, hence once the game has changed incumbents disappear.  
Furthermore, we have illustrated that the technology envisioned has several drawbacks that 
might motivate a social planner intervention, most notably the inherent redundancy of the 
social planner itself as it is inherently excluded from the economic interactions having been 
replaced by the ledger. With this disappearance that are significant side-effects that might be 
viewed as detrimental, most notably the lack of discretion in Tort based remediation of 
contractual disputes. This is a result of the code providing no recourse other than that which 
the algorithm dictates given the state of any input variables.  
Attempts to change the ledger to redress a tort may then be seen by some of the members of 
the community to change the very basic principles of a DLTs with CryptoECs and then can be 
resisted upfront by refusing to join the new “redressed” ledger thus yielding to a 
“Balkanization” of the market. In the words of Ethereum Classic’s Declaration of Independence: 
Ultimately, these breaches in fungibility and immutability were made possible by the 
subjective morality judgements of those who felt a burning desire to bring the alleged attacker 
to justice. However, in doing so they compromised a core pillar of Ethereum just to do what 
they felt was in the interests of the “greater good”. In a global community where each 
individual has their
 
own laws, customs, and beliefs, who is to say what is right and wrong? 
The desire of modern firms to capture information and process ideas in a flexible manner by 
the underpinning contracts will inevitably exhibit sufficient computational complexity that 
may
 
prevent careful forecasting of potential future states. The absence of a social authority to 
mitigate the extreme trajectories of markets dominated by unruly innovation might then yield 
less-than-desirable and surely far-from-predictable outcomes. 
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Appendix. Internet Compendium of Components of DLT For Payment Transaction 
Networks 
 
Following the history of the cryptocurrency PTNs, we can highlight 4 major categories. 
 
A. Digital cash PTNs (E-cash) 
The history of cryptocurrency PTNs can be dated back to David Chaum’s E-cash scheme (Chaum 1982). 
The PTN protocol for E-cash can be described in a simplified way as follows. 
 
1. Clients deposit some money at the bank that support E-cash. 
2. A payer send a serial number to the E-cash bank where the bank sign a Blind Signature on the serial number 
and debit the corresponding value from the payer's account. 
3. A payer, upon payment, will give the payee the serial number. 
4. The payee sends the serial number for verification at the bank. 
5. Upon successful validation, the bank will credit the corresponding value to the payee's account and mark 
the serial number as spent. 
The noteworthy features of the E-cash scheme is the anonymity level it provides. Even the cooperation between 
the bank and the payee would still not be able to identify the payer, all thanks to the Blind Signature technology 
that the scheme applies. However, it is still a form of converting a physical token into a digital one and 
there is only one central authority that maintains the ownership of the tokens. 
B. Blockchain based PTNs (Bitcoin) 
Subsequent attempts at a purely digital currency were B-Money (Dai 1998), hashcash (Finney 2004), and 
BitGold (Szabo 2005) which initially utilize “Proof-of-Work” (Jakobsson and Juels 1999), a hard 
cryptographic computational puzzle, as a mean of determining the inherent value for the medium of exchange 
(in Bitcoin). Later, the Bitcoin network, combining with a vast of research results in distributed systems, digital 
time-stamping, and cryptography, has brought about the most successful cryptocurrency in history so far. It 
is also worth to note that the Bitcoin approach is completely free of a central bank. The applications of 
Proof-of-Work and Blockchain are the core components that allow Bitcoin to be decentralized. 
Proof-of-Work provides the Bitcoin network’s users the capability to deposit value into the network. By solving 
a Proof-of-Work, the so-called “miner” will be rewarded with some Bitcoin. The Proof- of-Work is also a 
mechanism to prevent any attempt to revert a transaction that is already included in the blockchain. 
Blockchain is a sequence of applications of a hash function to a sequence of transactions. Every block contains 
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the information of the current transaction and a references to its previous block header’s hash. Ultimately, it 
will lead to the first block ever created, the Genesis block. The blockchain is shared by all nodes of the 
network and every transactions are stored within the blockchain so that it is transparent for everyone to 
know the balance of each account in the network. 
 
C. Bitcoin-esque PTNs 
Since the launch of Bitcoin in 2009, various Bitcoin-esque cryptocurrencies have been developed to solve 
several practical issues of the network. 
 Some of them use different hash functions. Litecoin and PotCoin utilize a memory-costly hash function 
(Percival 2009) to deter the use of hardware-based mining devices. 
 Some others try to improve the PTN’s scalability, e.g. BlackCoin and Nxt apply the Proof-of-Stake 
mechanism (Bitcoin Wiki   2015b) where the miners need to prove the ownership of a certain amount 
of cryptocurrency to improve throughput. Ripple (Ripple Labs 2015), on the other hand, applies the 
Byzantine Fault Tolerant algorithm by (Castro et al. 1999) to agree on a commit. 
 Anonymity and privacy are also noticeable issues of the Bitcoin network’s design. ZeroCoin (Miers et al. 
2013) is a combination of the E-cash scheme and Bitcoin to improve Bitcoin’s anonymity. Subsequently, 
the ZeroCoin approach was implemented as Moneta. 
 One of the primary concerns that central banks may have is losing control of money-supply as an instrument 
of policy. The RSCoin (Danezis and Meiklejohn 2015) approach is a Bitcoin extension which answers the 
call of the Bank of England’s research agenda (Bank of England 2015). The network delegates the 
monetary supply to a central authority, such as a bank, but utilizes a distributed network of other parties to 
perform transaction validation. However, as doing so, the network introduce a central point of failure 
which Bitcoin has tried to prevent. The central bank is still on top of the hierarchy and maintains the 
ultimate ledger. 
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D. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (Ethereum) 
Many of the new cryptocurrencies above also try to offer extended functionality. At an extreme this is 
represented by Ethereum which claims a “programming languages for financial contracts". 
“A built-in fully edged Turing-complete programming language that can be used to create “contracts" 
that can be used to encode arbitrary state transition functions, allowing users to create any of the 
systems described above, as well as many others that we have not yet imagined, simply by writing up 
the logic in a few lines of code" (Ethereum 2015). 
 
Table 4 Terms & Descriptions 
 
Balance  Database The database that keeps the balance of customers in a financial institution. 
Blockchain An online, distributed and append only ledger that needs an consensus algorithm to maintain its 
integrity. 
Blind   Signature The scheme that e-cash model uses to sign the Serial Number without knowing the content. The banks 
that support e-cash can have multiple signing key each of which assign a different value to the signed 
Serial Number (Chaum 1982) 
Deanonymization Although the distributed PTNs often offer anonymity in coins ownership and payment, the attacker 
has a chance to group and link the coins back to the owner by different methods (Koshy et al. 2014, 
Biryukov et al. 2014, Reid and Harrigan 2013, Fleder et al. 2015, Ron and Shamir 2013, Meiklejohn 
et al. 2013, Ron and Shamir 2014, Ober et al. 2013). 
Exchanger A third-party organization that provide exchange for the digital currency and another currency such 
as commodity, fiat or another digital currency (Bitcoin Wiki  2015a). 
Fork In a blockchain, a fork happens when more than one node sends the solution for the PoW. In this case, 
the nodes will keep track of all the forked blocks while working towards the next block. In the end, only 
one block will be kept in the main chain. 
Gateway The financial institution, e.g. bank, that provides liquidity to the Ripple network. A gateway usually 
keeps a cold wallet, which it uses to issue the issuances, and a hot wallet, which it uses to sign the 
transactions in the network (Ripple Labs  2015a). 
Issuance A representation of another currency, as long as it has some value and is exchangeable, in the Ripple 
network. An issuance is bound to an issuer. The currency that an issuance represent can cover other 
digital currencies such as Bitcoin, etc. as well as current real-world fiat currency, e.g. USD, EUR. It 
can also represent the virtual currency such as flight miles (Ripple Labs  2015a). 
Majority   attack When the malicious clients control the majority of the computational power, they can rewrite the 
transaction history (Nakamoto 2008, Rosenfeld 2014). 
Malleability Refers to an implementation flaw that allows the modifications in the transaction data without changing 
the hash value of the block header (Decker and Wattenhofer 2014). 
MarketMaker The Ripple client that offers the bid/ask orders to exchange from currency to currency (Ripple Labs 
2015b). 
Off-chain settlement The transactions are not all settled on the blockchain but some of them are aggregated in another 
network and then settled the net amount on the blockchain later (Bonneau et al. 2015). 
OrderBook The database that keeps track of bid/ask orders from MarketMakers (Ripple Labs  2015c). 
PathFinding The algorithm that automatically finds an exchange path for a payment in Ripple network that involves 
currency exchange using the OrderBook (Ripple Labs 2015d). 
Public  Key A public key, usually hashed, can serve as a destination address of a payment. This takes the role of a 
pseudonym to protect user privacy in the distributed PTNs. 
Private   Key A private key that is used to unlock the fund upon receiving at the Public Key address. 
Proof-of-Work A hard to solve but easy to verify puzzle, is used to prevent Denial-of-Service in distributed PTNs 
(Bitcoin Wiki 2015b). 
Selfish-mining In the Bitcoin network, the number of block contribution to the main chain of a node should be 
proportional to its computational power. Selfish-mining is an attack on the block mining mechanism 
that allows unfair block distribution (Eyal and Sirer 2014). 
Serial  Number The string that is kept secret to the owner, later the Serial# can be used to prove the ownership of the 
digital coin. 
Spent  Serial  Number 
Database 
The database that keeps track of the spent secrets. In e-cash model, the e-cash bank has to collect all 
the spent Serial Number to prevent them from being used twice. 
Transaction   Fee The transaction fee that is used as incentives for the distributed nodes working towards adding trans- 
actions into the blockchain. 
Unspent-Transaction- 
Output 
In a blockchain, the UTXO is the output of a previous transaction that has never been used as an input 
in another transaction. The UTXO is referenced by a tuple of previous transaction ID and the output’s 
index. To unlock the fund in the output, the owner has to provide the correspondent private key. 
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Wallet A collection of secrets(Serial Number, Private Key, etc.) to prove ownership of a specific 
digital coin (Bitcoin Wiki  2015c, Chaum et al. 1990). 
Zero-confirmation In the case of Bitcoin for fast-payment when the merchant cannot wait for even one 
confirmation (10 minutes average), the merchant suffers from the double-spending attack 
where the attacker broadcast two transactions: one to pay the merchant and another 
one to pay oneself with the same unspent outputs. The merchant will receive no fund 
if the latter transaction is confirmed first (Karame et al. 2012, 2015). 
 
 
 
